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Abstract: 
Native American obesity and the associated health conditions are generally thought to result in part from
a genetic predisposition to overeating fats and carbohydrates, called the “thrifty gene.”  Although coined
by nutritional scientists, this study maintains the origin of the thrifty gene lies in economics.  Apparently
harmful overconsumption and addiction constitute economically rational behavior if the increment to
current utility from adding to one’s stock of “consumption capital” is greater than the present value of
utility lost in the future due to ill health and the costs of withdrawl. Tests of these conditions for such
“rational addiction” are conducted using two-stage household production approach.  The results obtained
by estimating this model in a panel of Native and non-Native supermarket scanner data show that both
Natives and non-Natives tend to be inherently forward-looking in their nutrient choices, but Natives tend
to have far higher long-run demand elasticities for carbohydrates compared to non-Natives. 
Consequently, reductions in real food prices over time, primarily among foods that are dense in simple
carbohydrates, leads Native Americans to over-consume potentially harmful nutrients relative to their
traditional diet.
key words: Type II diabetes, household production, Native Americans, demand estimation,
shadow values. 
JEL Classification: 
 Deficiencies are noted among the Havasupai (Vaughan et al.), the Pima (Ravussin et al.), the Hopi2
(Brown and Brenton), the Hualapai (Teufel and Dufor), and the Navajo (Ballew et al.).
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Native American Obesity: An Economic Model of the “Thrifty Gene” Theory
Introduction 
Health officials and epidemiologists regard the incidence of conditions such as obesity,
hypertension, hyperglycemia, type-2 diabetes, and heart disease among Native American tribes as
a topic of major public policy concern.  In particular, the National Institute of Diabetes and
Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) reports that over “...one half of adult Pima Indians have
diabetes and 95% of those with diabetes are overweight” (NIDDK).  Diabetes afflicts other
Native American tribes and indigenous people or “transitional societies” around the world
(Vaughan; Eaton et al.).  In each case, diet, lifestyle, and genetic predisposition appear to
contribute to the problem.  Numerous studies have documented nutritional deficiencies among
Southwest Native American populations.   Common patterns in changes to these diets include a2
shift from high-protein, high-fiber and complex carbohydrate diet to one that is higher in
saturated fat and sugar, and low in both complex carbohydrates and fiber.  The most common
explanation for the apparently disfunctional diets of many Native American groups lies in the
notion that they possess a “thrifty gene” (Neel 1962).  Over many generations, surviving native
societies develop a means of sustaining themselves during times of famine by building up stores
of energy (fat) acquired during times of relative prosperity.  In modern welfare societies,
however, continuous prosperity and a sharp reduction in physical activity combine to produce an
over-accumulation of energy stores.  In economic terms, the thrifty gene theory implies that the
implicit value of potentially scarce nutrients are higher among Native Americans than among
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non-Native Americans, so they are led to substitute toward more calorie-dense, potentially
harmful nutrients.  There are, however, other explanations that rely more on behavioral
motivations than genetic predisposition.
Typically, health agencies respond to the problem of Native American malnutrition with
education and counseling services on the assumption that poor diets are borne of pathological,
irrational choices.  While Schelling, Thaler and Shefrin, and Winston explain addiction as the
reflection of consumers’ multiple selves – the buying self and the consuming self – such
explanations are of little empirical value because they admit a wide range of behaviors.  Further,
the thought that an entire class of individuals can make decisions without regard to their future
consequences is not only untenable, but contradicts the basic tenets of economic reasoning. 
Several authors develop economic explanations for obesity among the general population that
incorporate various assumptions about the roles of individual choice when technological change
reduces the cost of food intake relative to food usage (Lakdawalla and Philipson; Philipson and
Posner) or the cost of convenient food options (Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro).  Cawley, on the
other hand, acknowledges that calories may simply be addictive.  Using a similar line of
reasoning, this paper investigates the possibility that food, or more specifically nutrient, choices
among Native Americans – even apparently addictive, self destructive choices – result from fully
rational, forward thinking decisions.  
Becker and Murphy define addiction as a situation in which current consumption raises
future demand as the consumer builds a stock of “consumption capital” or habits (Iannaccone)
that increase the marginal utility of current consumption, but reduce future utility as his health
deteriorates.  Even when the addictive good is inherently harmful, consumption will rise so long
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as the increment to current utility is greater than the present value of all future costs.  Oriphanides
and Zervos, as well as Suranovic, Goldfarb and Leonard, however, argue that such dynamic (or
adjacent in the terminology of Becker and Murphy) complementarity may generate a form of
habitual consumption, but not truly addictive behavior.  Unlike the “happy addicts” of Becker
and Murphy, true addicts would like to change their current situation, but find that they cannot.
Adjustment costs, typically in the form of withdrawl symptoms, are necessary for addiction
because the negative utility induced by attempting to reduce consumption below a habitual level
makes quitting an irrational act (Suranovic, Goldfarb and Leonard).  While withdrawl from
alcohol or nicotine can indeed be painful, withdrawl from food can have more serious
consequences.  Adjustment costs, therefore, may explain why some Native American societies
appear to be trapped in patterns of poor dietary outcomes habits.  Most importantly, however, if
the genetic difference between Native and non-Native Americans manifests itself in a rational
addiction, then economic policy has a greater role than once thought in conditioning adverse
nutritional outcomes in an efficient way.
The primary empirical implication of the rational addiction model is that current
consumption responds to not only current and past prices, but expected future prices and
consumption as well.  Numerous empirical tests of the rational addiction model exist in the
literature, examining addictions to cigarettes (Gruber and Koszegi; Chaloupka; Keeler et al.;
Douglas; Becker, Grossman, and Murphy), alcohol (Grossman, Cahloupka and Sirtalan; Waters
and Sloan), cocaine (Grossman and Chaloupka) and caffeine (Olekalns and Bardsley) and heroin
(Bretteville-Jensen).  These studies show near uniform support for the rational addiction
hypothesis, but in very simple econometric models that may be consistent with many other
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theoretical explanations.  
A large body of empirical work has also arisen in response to the growing concern over
dietary adequacy in general and the demand for specific nutrients.  However, the bulk of these
studies (Park and Davis; Gould and Lin; Variyam et al.) study the role of nutrient information in
changing the observed quality of consumers’ diets and do not address price-responsiveness.
Gawn et al. also lack nutrient prices, but do find significant positive elasticities for income,
wages and education for both protein and total calories.  Using survey data, Adrian and Daniel
find negative income elasticities for carbohydrates – a finding that may help explain observed
Native consumption patterns.  Chung, Lee, Moss and Brown use an empirical framework very
similar to the current paper in a data set that does contain prices, but do not account for possible
nutrient addiction or even habitual consumption.
In this paper, we test for a rational addiction to fats and carbohydrates among Native
Americans using a two-stage approach based upon the household production model of Stigler
and Becker.  Because nutrient prices are not directly observable, a Generalized Leontief cost
function provides shadow values for each nutrient (protein, fat and carbohydrate) in the first
stage, while the second-stage nutrient demand model consists of a linear approximate AIDS
model, using the first-stage shadow values as data.  These models are used to generate elasticity
estimates for specific foods (stage one) and nutrients (stage two) for each demographic sub-
sample (Native and non-Native) so that comparisons can be made between them.  The data for
each sample comprises a uniquely detailed data set.  Specifically, supermarket scanner data on
food sales were obtained for eighteen stores of a single grocery chain in Arizona.  Nine of these
stores are located either on or near reservations, while the other nine in markets that are broadly
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representative of the general population.  Comparing shadow value and elasticity estimates
between the two sub-samples provides a relatively direct, natural test whether the thrifty gene
hypothesis or rational addiction models provide a better explanation for Native American dietary
choices. 
In estimating these models, the primary objective of this study is to provide policy makers
and health care providers better information as to the likely efficacy of price and income policy in
changing Native American dietary outcomes.  To do so, we determine whether dietary choices by
Native Americans can be explained as rational, market-driven economic decisions even though
they appear addictive and self-destructive.  The second section describes a theoretical model of
nutrient demand based on Becker and Murphy’s concept of rational addiction and extended to
include adjustment costs and differences in the budget set faced by Natives and non-Natives.  A
dynamic, two-stage econometric model of nutrient demand designed to test the implications of
the theoretical model is presented in the third section, while a fourth describes the unique store-
level retail scanner data set used herein.  A fifth section presents the empirical results and offers
some suggestions as to how these results may lead to better nutritional policy not only for Native
Americans, but for the obesity epidemic among non-Native Americans as well.
Economic Model of Rational Addiction, Withdrawl and the “Thrifty Gene”
Households (consumers) derive utility from nutrients, which they obtain from retail food
purchases.  In the context of a dynamic household production model of nutrient demand, the
primary macronutrients (fat, protein, carbohydrates) are non-market commodities and foods and
 Note that this does not literally imply that individuals accumulate stocks of nutrients, but rather the3
habitual consumption of them.  It is appropriate and intuitive to think of habitual consumption of nutrients and not
goods if we recognize that even the most addicted consumers shift among brands of cigarettes, beer or fast food
while satisfying the more primative craving for nicotine, alcohol or fat.  Although there is no empirical evidence of
addiction to protein, the most general version of the model allows for all possible addictions.  Which nutrients in fact
are addictive is an empirical question.
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beverages are market goods.  As in Stigler and Becker and Iannacone, assume further that
consumers form stocks of “consumption capital” of each commodity – stocks that rise with
current consumption, but depreciate over time.   Consumers’ optimization process consists of3
two stages.  In the first stage, consumers choose the amount of each nutrient subject to a wealth
constraint and an equation of motion that governs habit development.  In the second stage, they
minimize the cost of producing this fixed set of nutrient-outputs subject to the technological
constraint represented by the nutrient content of all available food-inputs.  In the conceptual
model, we combine the two stages in one optimization problem, but separate them in the
empirical application to follow.  
Defining the current consumption over an i dimensional vector of nutrients (i = protein,
fat, carbohydrate) at time t as n and the stock of accumulated consumption as N, the utility
function is written in vector notation as: U(n, N), which is increasing and concave in nutrients
n nn N NN nN(U  > 0,U  < 0) and decreasing and convex in nutrient capital (U  < 0,U  < 0, U  > 0).  These
assumptions embody the fundamental behavioral assumptions that lead to addiction.  Namely, 
nNU  > 0 implies that the marginal utility from consuming each nutrient rises in the stock of
Nconsumption capital – reinforcing consumption habits – while U  < 0 for harmful nutrients
(above a threshold level required for adequate nutrition) implies that utility is lower for each
consumption level at higher amounts of previous consumption (tolerance).  Given these
assumptions, each stock “nutrient capital” evolves according to the process:
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(1)
(2)
iwhere  is the (continuous) rate of change of the stock of nutrient i and *  is the constant rate of
depreciation for nutrient-stock i.  Allowing current additions to the stock of habits to depend on
N reflects the general concept that a household’s productivity in creating commodities depends in
part on the stock of accumulated capital.  Nutrient consumption is also constrained by a
thousehold’s available wealth (W ), which accumulates over time at the rate of interest (r), but is
jreduced by food purchases at a price p .  Assume further that households minimize their
expenditure on foods to achieve fixed nutrient levels so that the net change in wealth equals
annual interest income less the optimized cost of purchasing foods subject to a fixed nutritional
constraint: 
jwhere where x  are individual foods.  Further, there are significant
costs associated with changing nutrient consumption levels – withdrawl symptoms, the cost of
appetite suppressant drugs, and weight loss programs are examples.  However, adjustment costs
are fundamentally asymmetric because consumers can easily take in more than their habitual
amounts of each nutrient, but find it very difficult to consume less (Suranovic, Goldfarb and
Leonard).  Therefore, the adjustment cost function is discontinuous at the habitual consumption
level, such that:
 Utility is defined over nutrients and “nutrient capital” rather than more ephemeral concepts of “health” or4
“fitness” (Chaloupka; Becker and Murphy) because consumers obtain utility more directly from the characteristics of
the foods they eat.  Modeling commodities this way, however, does not rule out adding a prior stage in which health
or fitness are produced from human capital and food inputs.
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(3)
(4)
(5)
where  is the habitual consumption level of nutrient i and the adjustment cost function is
increasing and convex so that:  for all i.  Subject to the wealth and commodity
production constraints, consumers choose nutrients to maximize utility according to the current-
value Hamiltonian:   4
Applying the maximum principle to (4) yields first-order conditions for a dynamic optimum with
respect to nutrient content (in matrix notation): 
so the full-price of nutrient i is given by:
 where the $ notation differentiates the dynamic, or full price of each nutrient from its static
counterpart to be introduced below.  Similarly, the necessary condition with respect to the
(6)
 Other first-order conditions include the costate equation for wealth, W, which implies that in5
equilibrium.
 Clearly, relaxing this assumption allows a far more complete definition of addiction, so we return to this6
point below.  
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(7)
(8)
(9)
accumulated stock of each nutrient is:
where  is the derivative of the shadow value of nutrient capital with respect to time.  5
Taking the derivative of (5) with respect to time, substituting the solution for  from (6) and
solving for the optimal time-path of nutrient demand gives:
where  is the vector of optimal time-paths for each stock of nutrient capital.  Substituting the
solution for 8 from (8) provides an expression for nutrient demand as a function of the marginal
cost of nutrients, the gross investment in nutrient capital and parameters of the utility, cost and
cost of adjustment functions:
This solution provides several implications for nutrient demand that define and differentiate a
rational addiction from mere myopic, or habitual consumption.  
 Following Iannaccone, we simplify the interpretation of (9) by assuming for now that
nutrients are separable in demand.   Recall that the “reinforcement” effect of past consumption6
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nN(U ) is non-negative because previous consumption raises the marginal utility of current
nNconsumption for addictive nutrients.  Therefore, taking the derivative of (9) with respect to U ,
and recognizing that the first, inverted term is non-negative by the assumed concavity of utility
and convexity of adjustment costs, addictive consumption rises with the level of reinforcement. 
This is the source of adjacent or dynamic complementarity in Becker and Murphy in which a
higher stock of consumption capital generates higher levels of future consumption.  Second,
reinforcement is supported by a form of tolerance in which higher levels of previous
Nconsumption mean that existing levels of consumption provide lower levels of utility, or: U  < 0. 
Because this term enters (9) in a negative way, tolerance also leads to higher rates of
consumption for addictive nutrients relative to non-addictive nutrients.  Third, the shadow value
consumption capital, 8, represents the current value of all future costs incurred by addictive
behavior – all of the negative health implications that occur later in life.  Therefore, because 8 is
negative, greater future costs cause current consumption to fall.  
n iFourth, marginal adjustment costs (K ) are positive for all n  below the long-run average. 
iTherefore, if n  is falling (a consumer is dieting or, in prior years, a Native population enters a
period of relative scarcity), adjustment costs cause the rate of decline to slow, or even reverse
direction if sufficiently strong.  Adjustment costs have two additional effects as well.  In the first
nn iterm of (9), K  > 0 effectively reduces the convexity of U below so the rate of n  consumption
nNis higher than would otherwise be the case.  In the second term, K   reduces the reinforcement
i nN nNeffect for consumption levels below  to the extent where, if n  is falling and K  > U  , dieting
stops and eating resumes once again.  Thus, adjustment costs can effectively lock in an addicted
 It is important to emphasize that over-eating does not require conscious thought, nor is it learned behavior,7
but is rather an ingrained self-defense mechanism much like running from danger, or drinking when thirsty.  
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consumer such that the “happy addict” of Becker and Murphy is more likely the bundle of regret
described by Orphanides and Zervos, wanting to quit, but unable due to the high cost involved. 
Fifth, notice that higher rates of discount and depreciation, combined with negative 8 for
addictive nutrients, increase the current costs of future damage so lead to lower rates of current
consumption.  However, by expressing the current value multiplier in present value form:
higher rates of discounting and depreciation reduce the full present value cost of
future health damage, so cause consumption of the addictive commodity to rise. 
Although (9) accounts for all the characteristics of a rational addiction, it does not yet
differentiate rational addiction from a genetic predisposition toward overeating certain nutrients,
or the thrifty gene theory.  Smith describes the “genetic hardwiring” associated with the thrifty
gene in terms of a model of optimal genetic selection in which the survivors are those who are
able to store enough energy (body fat) in times of plenty to sustain themselves during famines. 
Consistent with notion that addictions can be rational because they are driven by acquired human
capital, genetic traits are also independent of consumer preferences because they impact the
expected budget set.  Thus, the thrifty gene hypothesis implies that, although famines may not
occur in modern times, those with the thrifty gene are more likely to behave as if there is a
positive probability of scarcity.   Formally, the possibility of seasonal scarcity is incorporated7
into the problem by defining two states of food availability, x  where i = (1, 2) and i = 1 indicatesi
famine and i = 2 indicates plenty.  Assuming the states are Bernoulli distributed and famine
occurs with a probability D, and “normal” times with probability (1 - D), the marginal cost of
 Modeling the thrifty gene effect in terms of a random budget set is not the only alternative.  Some argue8
that the thrifty gene theory implies a more efficient conversion of calories into body mass.  However, we do not have
access to body mass data so cannot test this implication directly. Nonetheless, it is a simple matter to show that the
theoretical implications are similar, namely that the shadow value of nutrients that are more efficiently converted to
body mass will be higher in groups with the thrifty gene than in those without. 
-12-
obtaining a fixed level of a particular nutrient i will be higher the less food is available:
where x  <  x .  Therefore, the full price of nutrient i to those with the thrifty gene is greater than1 2
the full price to those without to the extent that they are genetically conditioned to expect a
positive probability of famine:
where  is the full-price of nutrient i for those with the thrifty gene, and  to those
without.   8
The implication of the thrifty gene for nutrient demand is now clear.  Shortages of
different foods occur at different times, so the effect of random famines is likely to be nutrient-
specific.  To the extent that traditional Native American societies defined scarcity in terms of the
hunt, equation (11) implies that the Native protein shadow value is expected to be higher than the
shadow value for non-Natives.  In the absence of market prices, consumption of non-market
commodities is driven by relative shadow values, so if the shadow values for fats and
carbohydrates are relatively low, Native Americans are expected to substitute toward these
nutrients and away from protein. Further, given that elasticity rises with a good’s price, the
(10)
(11)
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elasticity of demand for protein will be higher, ceteris paribus.  More elastic demand, in turn,
suggests that higher relative prices over time will reduce protein consumption in favor of fats and
carbohydrates.  Whether this is the case, however, is an empirical question.     
Empirical Model of Native American Nutrient Consumption
Despite the fact that the rational addiction model has attracted a large volume of empirical
interest in recent years, nutritional addiction presents a somewhat unique application.  For this
reason, replicating existing empirical methods is not appropriate to test among the potential
explanations for nutrient overconsumption.  First, these studies define utility directly over the
addictive good, for which prices are readily available.  In the case of food, however, utility is
defined over nutrients and not individual foods (Silberberg).  Therefore, we use a two-stage
econometric approach based on the household production model of Stigler and Becker wherein
shadow prices for addictive, non-market nutrients are imputed in the first stage for inclusion in a
second-stage model of nutrient demand.  Second, these studies consider univariate consumption
problems in which a representative consumer is either addicted to a particular good or not.  In the
case of food, however, addiction is a relative concept when a group of nutrients are all necessary
for survival and, to a certain extent, substitutable.  Third, each of these models is based on an
assumption of quadratic utility so that simple, linear demand functions follow directly from
dynamic first order conditions.  However, this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive.  Although
such an approach ensures that the demand model is consistent with a dynamic solution, it is not
consistent with any other model of optimal consumer demand.  Rather, this study uses a demand
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system that is based on a more restrictive model of utility maximization, but one that can
nonetheless be used to test the implications of a general dynamic optimization model.  In this
way, we show that it is possible to provide a much richer description of addictive behavior with a
flexible demand system.  Fourth, the presence of a thrifty gene impacts relative shadow prices
and elasticity values and cannot be represented by specific arguments of the utility function. 
Finally, no existing empirical models of food addiction incorporate adjustment costs as an
explanation for overweight individuals who are not satisfied with their condition – an implication
of the rational addiction model that is logically hard to accept (Oriphanides and Zervos). 
Consequently, the empirical model developed here takes each of these considerations into
account.
The household production approach is a well-understood way of describing the demand
for non-market commodities (Becker; Stigler and Becker; Deaton and Muellbauer; Betancourt
and Gautschi).  From this perspective, households maximize their nutrition-utility through a two-
stage process.  Households first solve a cost-minimization problem by combining inputs (market
goods, or foods) and consumption capital in order to produce non-market commodities
(nutrients) at a minimum cost subject to a technology constraint. For the current problem, the set
of non-market commodities consists of total grams of fat, protein, and carbohydrates sold by each
store, while the food-inputs include total volumetric measures of dairy, bakery, meat, produce,
beverages, and snack foods sold each week.  By choosing a functional form for the dual cost
function described above that is both flexible and amenable to multi-product cost minimization,
we account for the interaction among potentially addictive products.  Specifically, a Generalized
Leontief (GL) functional form is flexible and includes multiple outputs in a parsimonious way. 
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(12)
(13)
(14)
In addition, the GL is also strictly increasing in p and n, decreasing in N, linearly homogeneous,
concave in input prices and convex in output, as required by the restrictions implied by
constrained optimization.  A modified GL cost function representing the solution to the first
stage of the household’s problem is written as:
where A, B, C, D, E, and F are conformable parameter matrices.  The cost function (12) is
estimated with its implied input demand functions in order to both improve efficiency and
impose cross-equation restrictions implied by demand theory.  Therefore, if (12) satisfies the
required curvature conditions (which are imposed in estimation), it is dual to the household
production technology g, so applying Shephard’s Lemma to (12) provides a system of input
demand equations:
for all food categories, i.  Symmetry in prices, nutrients, and capital (N) is imposed prior to
estimation.  While tests of the primary hypotheses of the paper concern the second-stage nutrient
demand model, food input elasticities are also of considerable interest because foods are
purchased directly by consumers while nutrients are not.  Based on the input demands in (13), a
typical element of the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities of demand is given by:
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(15)
(16)
for foods i = 1, 2, ... 6 and k = 1, 2, .... 6.  While the first-stage procedure described to this point
characterizes the demand for each food-input, the focus of this study is on the demand for the
aggregate of each nutrient these foods embody. 
In the second stage of (4) above, households choose nutrients to maximize utility subject
to a lifetime wealth constraint.  Nutrients are assumed to be fixed outputs in (12), so
differentiating the optimal cost function with respect to commodity quantities provides a vector
of implicit prices for each consumption good (nutrient):  
for all j non-market nutrients.  Further, if the household production function has constant returns
to scale, then the cost function is linearly homogeneous.  Deaton and Muellbauer show that the
minimum cost to produce the desired bundle of nutrients can be found using Euler’s Theorem as
the sum of “shadow expenditures” on each non-market nutrient:
iwhere B  is the static, or myopic cost of nutrients.
With nutrient prices and total expenditure calculated in (16), it remains to define
preferences in (4) such that the joint hypotheses of rational addiction, adjustment costs and thrifty
gene may be tested  In analyzing the dynamics of the rational addiction model, Becker and
Murphy suggest that there are two ways to proceed: (1) linearize the first order conditions, or (2)
define a quadratic utility function such that the first order conditions are naturally linear. 
Virtually all empirical applications of the rational addiction model adopt the second approach
 Implied restrictions on the demand system include: (1) constant real rates of time preference, (2) constant9
relative prices over time, and (3) no liquidity constraints (Alessie and Kapteyn).  Each of these are reasonable given
the short time frame of the data set used here.  
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(Chaloupka; Becker, Grossman and Murphy; Grossman and Chaloupka; Olekalns and Bardsley
and others).  For current purposes, specifying utility as quadratic is not practical, nor desirable,
because of the multi-product nature of the utility maximization problem.  In adopting a systems
approach, however, it is necessary to ensure that the resulting demand model is consistent with
two-stage intertemporal budgeting.  If the habit formation process is myopic (Pollak) then
preferences are intertemporally separable, so the entire process can be estimated using an Euler
equation for allocation over time and a general demand system for the allocation of goods within
each period (MacCurdy).  However, if habits or addictions are formed rationally, then
preferences are inherently non-separable.  Spinnewyn shows that it is possible to specify a
demand model in which consumers form habits rationally if the price of consumption goods is
adjusted to include the future cost of habit formation to define the full-price of each nutrient as in
(6).   Whereas Spinnewyn provides an example of this approach using an indirect addilog utility9
function, Pashardes shows that the same method can be used in a more general, flexible AIDS
demand specification.
Pashardes’ AIDS model is only dynamic, however, in the sense that it includes prices that
reflect the full dynamic cost of habituated goods.  Ray and Alessie and Kapteyn, on the other
hand, develop AIDS models that are fully consistent with rational, or forward looking consumer
behavior.  In this paper, we use a dynamic AIDS model similar to Alessie and Kapteyn to model
second-stage nutrient allocations, but substitute the first-stage intertemporal Euler equation of
Becker and Murphy and Chaloupka in order to test for any addictive behavior, whether this
 Note that the full price of nutrient i is calculated using the present value multiplier, 10
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(20)
behavior is rational or myopic, or whether it is dominated by a thrifty gene explanation. 
Specifically, begin by writing the second-stage PIGLOG nutrient expenditure function as:
where: 
and: 
and is a vector of full-cost, or dynamic nutrient prices defined in (6) above.   Further,10
consistent allocation at the second stage requires symmetry: homogeneity:
and adding up:   Substituting (18) and (19)
into (17) and applying Shephard’s Lemma provides share equations for each nutrient:
for all i nutrients, where  is the budget share of nutrient i,  is the total expenditure on all
nutrients and is a Stone’s price index defined as: In order to test whether
(17)
(18)
(19)
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nutrient demand among Natives and non-Natives are consistent with rational addiction and if
consumption is subject to adjustment costs, we substitute a modification of Becker and Murphy’s
dynamic solution for into (20), which allows the budget share for each nutrient to vary with
lagged share, future share, the stock of accumulated nutrient demand and negative periodic
deviations from mean budget share:
for each nutrient.  If the coefficient on lagged share is significantly different from zero, then
current consumption depends on past consumption, which can be consistent with either habitual
or myopic addictive behavior.  If, however, the coefficient on future consumption and the current
stock of nutrients are different from zero, then this uniquely identifies a rational addiction.  If
negative budget-share deviations have a significant effect on nutrient demand, then adjustment
costs may also play a role in driving addictive behavior as well.  Based on the argument
expressed in equation (9), it is expected that this effect will be negative.
Unlike the test for rational addiction, there are no economic variables that can be used to
test directly for the thrifty gene.  Rather, as equation (11) indicates, we can infer the impact of
genetic variation on shadow values and, hence, price elasticities and levels of consumption.  If
Native Americans do indeed possess a thrifty gene, then the shadow value of nutrients they
perceive to be in short supply should be inflated.  According to nutritionists who have studied
Pima Indians in both Arizona and their native Mexico, the nutrient most commonly absent during
scarce times is protein (Ravussin, et al.).  Therefore, the thrifty gene implies relatively high
(22)
 Chalfant shows that the appropriate price-elasticity for a linear-approximate AIDS model is:11
iwhere *  is Kronecker’s delta.  
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protein shadow values and substitution away from proteins toward foods rich in fat and
carbohydrates.  Further, differentiating the linear-approximate AIDS price-elasticity expression
with respect to price shows that higher prices are associated with higher own-price elasticities of
demand, ceteris paribus.   Consequently, testing for the thrifty gene involves comparing both11
shadow values and own price elasticities between Native and non-Native sub-samples.  Casting
the model in a systems framework also allows for another explanation that calorie-based theories
of obesity cannot.  While some substitution among nutrients is likely to occur, it is also expected
that some nutrients may also be complements, given that they all contribute to the body’s
fundamental need for caloric energy.  If the relative shadow value of fat and carbohydrates are
lower for Native Americans due to the thrifty gene, then increased consumption of one may in
fact reinforce higher consumption of the other.  Moreover, given that technological progress has
reduced the relative price of food in general over time (Philipson and Posner; Lakdawalla and
Philipson) and processed foods rich in both fats and highly refined carbohydrates in particular,
then Natives will be more likely to consume more calorie-dense nutrients than is optimal for their
body type.  No prior studies have been able to conduct such a comparison between genetically
distinct groups due to a lack of comparable food-purchase data.  
Data Description
In contrast, the data used in this study provide a unique and highly detailed means of comparing
 The non-Native stores were selected by solving an integer programming blending problem, where12
constraints were placed on the average demographic characteristics of the optimal sample, so that it would resemble
the state averages.
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food consumption patterns between Native and non-Native Americans.  Specifically, we use
retail supermarket scanner data on food prices and purchase-volumes recorded over a thirteen-
week period in 2001 for nine stores of the same chain (Basha’s Supermarket) located on or near
Native American reservations in Arizona (the Native subsample) and for nine stores located in
other areas throughout the state (non-Native sub-sample).  Basha’s Supermarket holds a
dominant market position in rural regions and is a major competitor in urban retail markets, and
follows chain-wide pricing strategies so there is no scope for price-discrimination within the
state.  Further, non-Native stores are selected so that they demographic profile of the local market
mirrors the Arizona population as a whole as closely as possible, providing a natural control
group against which Native store sales can be compared.   Table 1 presents a listing of the stores12
and the demographic characteristics for the local market served by each store.  
The scanner data consists of dollar sales and unit volume on a weekly basis for each
major product category: dairy, bakery, snack foods, and beverages.  Only total dollar sales are
available for meats and produce.  Unit value indices, a proxy for price, are calculated as the ratio
of category sales to unit volumes for all product categories, except meat and produce.  Because
unit volumes reflect a simple number-count of items sold within the category as a whole, the
implicit assumption is that the product-mix remains the same from week to week.  Although
violations of this assumption are likely to occur, individual product prices are not available.  For
meats and produce, unit volumes are calculated by dividing total sales by an estimate of the local
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market price.  For meat, the estimate was taken from a monthly retail price from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and converted to a weekly series using a cubic spline extrapolation method.  For
fresh produce, total dollar values and unit volumes for all sample stores were obtained from
FreshLook Marketing of Chicago, Illinois and were used to calculate weekly unit prices for each
store.
Nutrient quantities were inferred from observed food purchases using nutrient tables and
food consumption data published with the USDA CSFII survey.  Using the consumption share of
each food product as weight, average food nutrient profiles were constructed for each category. 
With the nutrient content of each food category known, the weekly nutrient consumption in each
market area is computed as a Stones quantity index, where   is the content of
knutrient j in food category k; s  is the share of expenditures on food category k measured at each
store on a weekly basis.
Total weekly food expenditure is the dependent variable in the first-stage of the
econometric model.  At this stage, the modified Generalized Leontief cost function is estimated
using non-linear three-stage least squares with symmetry, concavity in prices and fixed inputs,
and convexity in outputs (nutrients) imposed.  Initial tests revealed significant autocorrelation, so
each equation was estimated using the Prais-Winsten autocorrelation correction procedure.  In
the second stage, each dynamic linearized AIDS model was also estimated using non-linear
three-stage least squares with symmetry and homogeneity imposed.  Instruments at this stage
consist of lead and lagged nutrient shadow values, lagged food input prices and quantities, lagged
expenditure and a time trend.  All models were estimated using a fixed-store-effect approach to
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control for unobserved store-based heterogeneity.
Results
Estimates of the two-stage nutrient demand system are used to test four primary hypotheses of
this paper: (1) protein shadow values are expected to be relatively high among Native Americans
relative to non-Native Americans, causing substitution away from proteins to fat- and
carbohydrate based foods and higher price-elasticities of demand, (2) consumption of fats and
carbohydrates can be addictive, (3) addictions are formed in a rational, or forward-looking way,
and (4) adjustment costs explain the existence of food-addicts who regret their situation, despite
its apparent rationality.  If the first hypothesis is found to be true, then expectations of future
protein price increases will cause a more dramatic shift away from proteins toward cheaper, and
more harmful, fats and simple carbohydrates.
Before testing specific hypotheses regarding individual nutrient shadow values, it is first
necessary to test whether members of each sub-sample differ in their consumption behavior. 
Because the data period and product selection are the same for all stores, each sub-sample is
nested within a larger, combined sample.  Therefore, comparisons between samples are made
using likelihood ratio tests.  With 70 restrictions, the critical chi-square value at a 5% level of
significance is 90.531, while the estimated likelihood ratio value is 185.876.  Consequently, we
reject the null hypothesis that the Native and non-Native samples share the same cost function
and estimate nutrient shadow values and food elasticities with separate cost function models.  For
each sub-sample, table 2 provides the shadow values for each nutrient and nutrient stock as well
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as the input demand elasticity for each food category.  
The thrifty gene theory suggests that the full-price of nutrients deemed essential for long-
term survival will be higher for those possessed of the gene than for those who are not.  Diamond
provides a convincing recent explanation as to why individuals of European origin are not likely
to be affected by the thrifty gene, whereas Native Americans are.  Based on the results in table 2,
our estimates provide some empirical support for the economic implications of the thrifty gene
theory.  Indeed, protein, the nutrient nutritionists cite as the primary component of a traditional
Native American diet, has a relative shadow value many times greater than among non-Native
Americans.  Specifically, while the ratio of the protein and fat shadow prices in the Native
sample is 1.57, the same ratio among non-Natives is 0.38.  A similar relationship holds among
the protein and carbohydrate shadow prices.  Because shadow prices drive behavior for non-
market commodities, Native Americans have an incentive to reduce protein consumption in favor
of fats and simple carbohydrates.  Essentially, if Native Americans are genetically conditioned to
expect a shortage of a key nutrient in their diet, then their implicit valuation will reflect a higher
scarcity value than non-Native Americans ascribe to the same nutrient.  This point is underscored
by the positive value of accumulated protein consumption stocks for Native Americans.  While
all other stocks have negative shadow values, which is a necessary condition for a nutrient to be
ideemed “harmful” or in overconsumption (Becker and Murphy), a positive value of 8  reflects an
expectation of positive utility throughout the planning horizon, or that the addiction, if it exists,
is a “beneficial” one.
[table 2 in here]
Although diet-related health problems are tied to the overconsumption of particular
 Although the coefficient on future share is negative, the effect of current stocks is positive and13
significant, as would be expected if non-Natives are rationally addicted to fats.
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nutrients (Wright, et al.), the demand for different types of food is important as food is, of
course, the primary medium for nutrient delivery.  As such, any policy designed to modify
nutrient intake would have to be implemented through food.  In this regard, the results in table 2
provide some important insights into differences in the structure of demand between the Native
and non-Native samples.  Specifically, the elasticity of demand for fresh produce among Natives
is far below that of non-Natives.  Therefore, as fruit and vegetable prices decline over time,
Native American demand will rise less than for other groups.  Similarly, the higher demand
elasticities for beverages and snacks suggest that lower prices for these products will induce a
large consumption response.  This result is consistent with observed dietary patterns among many
Native American communities.  Further, given recent upward trends in meat prices, the relatively
high meat demand elasticity can explain some of the shift in consumption away from meats to
lower-priced foods.  Nonetheless, a more direct analysis of the underlying cause of nutrient
imbalance requires an examination of the ultimate demand for specific macronutrients.
Cawley finds that consumers can form a rational addiction for calories.  Whether the
same is true for individual nutrients is an empirical question.  In table 3, the LAIDS demand
parameter estimates show that, although non-Natives exhibit no evidence of an addiction to
either protein or carbohydrates, there is some evidence of a forward-looking, or rational addiction
to fat.   Nor do adjustment costs appear to influence non-Native consumption of either protein or13
carbohydrates.  If fat consumption falls below trend, however, there is a strong tendency for
adjustment costs to force non-Natives to return to average levels.  Natives, on the other hand,
-26-
appear to exhibit habitual behavior with respect to all nutrients (at a 10% level of significance)
but accumulated consumption is only significant for protein and, at a 10% level, carbohydrates. 
Because none of the future-consumption parameters are significantly different from zero, these
results provide little evidence for a rational addiction to any nutrient.  Adjustment costs,
however, appear to be particularly strong for Native Americans.  For each nutrient, negative
deviation from trend exhibits the greatest statistical impact on current consumption, suggesting
that breaking existing habits will be particularly costly and, therefore, less likely.  Once
differences in habit are accounted for, the thrifty gene theory suggests that differences in
consumption patterns may also be due to differences in shadow values and elasticities.
[table 3 in here] 
Indeed, elasticity estimates derived from the nutrient AIDS model shown in tables 3 and 4
provide some support for the thrifty gene hypothesis.  Namely, if protein shadow prices are high
among Native Americans, then we would expect to see the relatively high protein-demand
elasticities reported in table 4.  Highly elastic demand, in turn, implies larger reductions in
consumption over time as high protein foods become relatively more expensive than processed
foods that are high in simple sugars, fats and low in dietary fiber.  Furthermore, given that the
results in table 4 show protein and carbohydrates to be relatively strong substitutes among Native
Americans, rising protein shadow prices are likely to cause a reallocation toward carbohydrates
from proteins.  In addition, the relatively high-price elasticity of demand for carbohydrates
among Native Americans means that a lower shadow price will cause a larger increase in
consumption than among non-Natives.  These results are all consistent with survey data reported
by Teufel and Dufour and Vaughan who find relatively high carbohydrate consumption levels
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among different tribes of Native Americans living in the U.S. Southwest.  Further, some suggest
that income differences may explain some of the “obesity gap” among groups within the same
society (Chou, et al.).  In this case, non-Natives are more likely to consume increasing amounts
of protein and fat as incomes rise, while Natives consume more protein and carbohydrates.  For
both groups, however, finding protein to be a “luxury” and carbohydrate a “staple” suggests that
rising incomes should contribute to both groups consuming a more protein-intensive diet and less
fat and carbohydrates as a proportion of total calories.  
[table 4 in here]
The implications of these results for the nutrition and health care communities are clear. 
First, to the extent that rising consumption of fats among non-Native Americans can be described
as a rational addiction, then policies that impact consumers’ expectations of future nutrient
prices, and costs of their addiction, will be more effective than information or behavioral
intervention.  Second, the same policies will likely not be as effective among Native Americans. 
Rather, if overconsumption of harmful nutrients is myopically-habitual and genetic in origin,
then Native consumers fail to internalize future costs as the rational addiction model suggests. 
As a result, the appropriate policy may be to address current behavior through an intervention
that addresses differences between current market prices and implicit valuations of each nutrient. 
Further, given the importance of adjustment costs in contributing to habituated consumption of
all nutrients, reducing the cost of “withdrawl” by providing healthy alternatives may also play a
critical role.   
Conclusions
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This study examines whether or not the alarming incidence of obesity and type 2 diabetes among
Native American societies is of economic origin.  Relative to non-Native communities, survey
evidence finds that Natives tend to consume a disproportionate amount of both total calories, and
the proportion of calories from fat and carbohydrates – both calorie-dense relative to protein –
despite well-understood, long-term negative health implications.  Becker and Murphy claim that
such apparently addictive behavior can be the result of a rational decision making process
wherein the addict  values current consumption more than the cost of future health implications. 
Including the fact that that deviating from habitual consumption patterns imposes a significant
adjustment cost, nutrient addictions can be justified on economic grounds alone.  Nutritionists
and anthropologists, on the other hand, suggest that such behavior may be due to a “thrifty gene”
whereby Native Americans are genetically predisposed to place a higher implicit demand on
nutrients that were once necessary for survival, but often found to be in short supply.  This paper
tests among these explanations for observed Native American dietary patterns.
Empirical tests of these hypotheses are possible due to a unique, highly detailed panel
data set that describes comparable Native and non-Native food purchases from a single
supermarket grocery chain.  With nine stores serving predominantly Native customers (approx.
95%) and nine with a representative non-Native sample, comparisons between each sample
reveal stark differences in food purchases and, hence, nutrient valuations.  Econometric tests
using these data are developed within a dynamic household production framework in which the
shadow value of each nutrient – protein, fat and carbohydrate – is estimated using a first-stage,
dual cost function and the structure of nutrient demand is then estimated using a second-stage
dynamic AIDS specification.  Contrary to most previous research on potentially addictive
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products, this study finds little support for the rational addiction model in either the Native or
non-Native samples.  Nutrient demand among Native Americans, however, is consistently
habitual, driven largely by dietary “adjustment costs,” or withdrawl symptoms in non-economic
terms.  Perhaps more importantly, however, comparisons of nutrient shadow values between
Native and non-Native samples show that the full-price, or dynamic shadow value, of protein is
far greater among Natives than among non-Natives.  Consequently, Natives have an incentive to
substitute away from protein toward more calorie-dense, and potentially harmful, carbohydrates. 
Combining all potential explanations in the same demand model, therefore, this study finds
considerable support for the thrifty gene theory rather than the rational addiction model as an
explanation for Native American obesity.
 Typically, studies that find support for a rational addiction to cigarettes, alcohol or
caffeine suggest that policies designed to increase addicted consumers’ expectations of future
prices will be particularly effective in changing current behavior. However, if nutrient-addiction
is instead myopically addictive and driven largely by adjustment costs, then current prices and
consumption behavior become more important in changing future patterns of consumption. 
Moreover, if over-consumption is indeed genetic in origin, then price-based interventions will be
less effective, unless targeted to the upward bias in implicit prices for more healthy nutrients.  
Although this study provides important insights into the structure of Native American
nutrient demand and its likely causes, a more definitive analysis of the problem would benefit
from data on health outcomes – either instances of diabetes, or variation in body mass over time
or among individuals.  Further, because the data used in this study cannot be used to generate
reliable per capita consumption figures, we are unable to analyze the demand for per capita
-30-
calories as well as the allocation of calories among macro-nutrients.  Controlling for both in a
consistent, two-level demand framework would provide better information on the factors that
drive overall caloric intake as well as its composition among nutrients.
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Table 1. Summary of Native and non-Native Store Location Demographic Characteristics.
Sample/
Store Location Tribe
Native
American White Black Hispanic
Median
Household
Income
Household
Size
Households
with Children
Average Age
HH
Head
.......... Percent of Population .......... $ No. % Years
Native American Store Locations
1 Peridot, AZ Apache 94.1 2.7 0.0 2.4 30,250 4.3 47.2 23.9
2 Sells, AZ Tohono O'odham 96.6 2.3 0.1 2.8 18,048 3.7 38.2 25.3
3 Whiteriver, AZ Apache 95.0 3.5 0.1 1.7 19,807 4.1 54.8 21.7
4 Kayenta, AZ Navajo 94.5 4.3 0.1 1.0 22,911 3.8 51.1 23.2
5 Tuba City, AZ San Juan Southern
Paiute (Navajo)
93.2 4.6 0.1 2.1 36,192 3.9 49.5 24.0
6 Chinle, AZ Navajo 95.1 3.5 0.1 1.3 21,201 3.8 49.2 22.4
7 Pinon, AZ Navajo 97.3 2.4 0.0 0.8 13,797 4.0 50.3 22.0
8 Window Rock, AZ Navajo 93.6 4.5 0.2 1.7 37,206 3.5 49.8 26.3
9 Crownpoint, NM Navajo 94.6 4.2 0.2 0.9 21,276 3.6 48.9 24.2
Sub-sample Average 94.9 3.5 0.1 1.7 24,521 3.9 48.8 23.7
Non-Native American Store Locations
10 Gilbert, AZ N/A 0.5 88.0 1.9 11.0 63,735 3.1 50.2 30.5
11 Mesa, AZ N/A 1.4 76.1 2.4 30.0 41,137 3.0 40.7 28.1
12 Phoenix, AZ N/A 3.8 76.2 5.0 25.0 36,150 2.2 22.3 36.0
13 Phoenix, AZ N/A 5.3 69.3 4.6 30.2 32,234 2.2 23.2 33.0
14 Phoenix, AZ N/A 3.4 74.3 3.8 29.2 37,031 2.2 21.4 35.1
15 Phoenix, AZ N/A 1.7 82.1 3.3 18.7 40,105 2.6 31.9 32.1
16 Phoenix, AZ N/A 1.4 76.1 2.4 30.0 41,137 3.0 40.7 28.1
17 Scottdale, AZ N/A 1.9 86.3 1.7 14.2 40,686 2.2 20.6 38.6
18 Tucson, AZ N/A 3.4 70.1 3.5 32.4 23,047 2.3 25.9 32.6
Sub-sample Average 2.5 77.6 3.2 24.5 39,474 2.5 30.8 32.7
State Average 5.0 75.5 3.1 25.3 40,558 2.6 32.2 34.2
Source: U.S. Census, 2000 U.S. Census, ZIP code areas.
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Table 2. Food Demand Elasticities and Shadow Values: Native and non-Native Americans,
Generalized Leontief Cost Function Estimates 
Non-Native Sample Native Sample
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Own-Price Elasticities
, -0.361* -19.213 -0.212* -8.977P
,  -0.125* -8.944 -0.235* -7.461M
, -0.576* -8.541 -0.264* -5.181B
, -0.314* -18.828 -0.745* -19.820V
, -0.144* -7.496 -0.182* -6.801D
, -0.231* -4.482 -0.356* -7.089S
Nutrient-Stock Shadow Values
-34.178* -5.449 70.773* 6.967
-28.612* -5.056 -68.882* -7.922
-7.886* -5.334 -5.248* -4.314
Nutrient-Consumption Shadow Values
PB 80.384* 3.542 1,325.932* 17.579
FB 278.101* 17.950 732.174* 9.909
CB 327.376* 10.238 700.582* 18.848
     In this table, ,  is the price elasticity of demand for market-good i, where P = fresh produce, M = meat, B =1 i
bread, D = dairy products, V = beverages, and S = snacks.   is the present-value stock-shadow value for non-
jmarket nutrient j, where P = protein, F = fat and C = carbohydrate.  B  is the consumption shadow value for non-
market nutrient j, where P = protein, F = fat and C = carbohydrate.  A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5%
level. 
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Table 3. LAIDS Demand Parameter Estimates: Non-Native and Native Samples
Protein Fat Carbohydrate
Non-Native Sample
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratioa
0" -0.586* -5.308 -1.105* -7.848 3.422* 29.700
t-1w -0.031 -0.785 0.032 1.574 -0.002 -0.080
t+1w 0.077 1.496 -0.039 -1.391 0.008 0.210
t)w 0.094 0.675 -0.620* -6.994 -0.090 -0.646
ln(N) -0.001 -0.189 0.006* 3.051 -0.013* -2.956
0.088* 9.010 -0.057* -6.549 -0.006 -0.314
-0.057* -6.549 0.150* 10.790 -0.093* -5.456
-0.006 -0.314 -0.093* -5.456 0.100* 3.213
0.122* 9.823 0.251* 9.299 -0.529* -20.230
R 0.957 0.976 0.9462
D.W. 2.279 2.051 2.269
Native Sample
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
0" -0.032 -0.125 0.779* 2.205 1.331* 3.764
t-1w 0.176* 2.929 0.116 1.729 0.115 1.750
t+1w 0.001 0.020 -0.085 -1.680 0.005 0.068
t)w -1.647* -7.116 -1.443* -4.758 -1.858* -11.180
ln(N) 0.005* 2.597 0.001 0.329 0.005 1.650
-0.026 -0.436 -0.042* -3.280 0.068 1.118
-0.042* -3.280 0.095* 7.867 -0.053* -4.153
0.068 1.118 -0.053* -4.153 -0.015 -0.236
0.084 1.676 -0.119 -1.705 -0.178* -2.359
R 0.688 0.903 0.7292
D.W. 2.081 2.053 2.067
0 t-1 A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level.  In this table, "  is a constant term, w  is the share of each
a
t+1 tnutrient lagged one period, w  is the share of each nutrient lead one period, )w  is the deviation in expenditure
ishare from the sample mean, N is the stock of past consumption of each nutrient, p  is the shadow price of nutrient i, i
= P, F, C.  X is the total expenditure on all nutrients and P is a Stone’s price index defined over all nutrients.  Store-
specific dummy variable estimates are excluded for brevity. 
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Table 4.  Nutrient Demand Elasticity Estimates: Non-Native and Native Samples
Nutrient Shadow Values
Protein Fat Carbohydrate
Nutrient Quantities Non-Native Sample
Proteina -0.144(-1.294)
-0.376*
(-8.777)
0.006*
(2.093)
Fat -0.922*(-9.321)
-0.539*
(-8.098)
0.003
(1.163)
Carbohydrate -1.019*(-4.386)
-1.269*
(-9.881)
-0.328*
(-5.306)
Expenditure 2.356*(17.063)
2.185*
(17.149)
0.243*
(6.503)
Native Sample
Protein -1.165*(-5.778)
-0.026
(-0.156)
0.243
(1.805)
Fat -0.178*(-3.299)
-0.321*
(-4.403)
-0.044
(-1.333)
Carbohydrate 0.078(0.403)
0.048
(0.203)
-0.851*
(-6.210)
Expenditure 1.266*(7.981)
0.299
(0.728)
0.652*
(4.425)
 A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level. All elasticities are defined as Marshallian elasticities,a
evaluated at the sample means of each variable. 
